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JAMES M. LINDSAY IS 
former Director of UT’s 
Strauss Center for Interna-
tional Security and Law and 
Tom Slick Chair for Inter-
national Affairs at the LBJ 
School of Public Affairs. Dr. 
Lindsay interviewed former 
president of Mexico Ernesto 
Zedillo on April 17, 2009, 
during his attendance at 
the LLILAS-sponsored con-
ference The Origins, Implementation, and Spread of Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programs in Latin America. 
JL: President Zedillo, thank you very much for agreeing to sit down with 
us. I’d like to talk to you a little about globalization. The argument for 
globalization has been that the growing interconnectedness of nations and 
societies would make us all more prosperous. There was a lot of enthusiasm 
for globalization in the 1990s. In recent months we’ve discovered that 
globalization has a downside as well as an upside. With the recent inter-
national financial crisis, people are discovering that it not only can make 
us better off, but also worse off. Much like during the Great Depression, 
we’re seeing a number of countries raising trade barriers, trying to find 
ways to insulate themselves from the international economy.
So, are we witnessing a temporary reversal in globalization or some-
thing much more significant?
EZ: Well, I think that’s a great question, and of course there is always 
a risk that this could signal the beginning of a serious reversal of 
globalization. It has happened before in history. We had a golden age 
of globalization in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth cen-
tury, and then with the outbreak of the First World War, and even more 
significantly after the war with the Great Depression, we saw a practically 
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total destruction of the globalization that had been achieved before. 
So, I have never shared the opinion of some authors who say that this 
time around will be different, since this globalization, they say, is driven 
purely by technological factors. [They say] it is impossible to destroy 
technology and to reverse globalization. I believe, and I have written 
about this for some time, that globalization was essentially a political 
construction, an explicit decision by governments to lower trade and 
investment barriers, and of course we have fantastic instruments like 
the Internet and other modern means of communication and transporta-
tion to ease the development of globalization. But if countries become 
protective, defensive, isolationist, they will destroy globalization, and 
I think that will be dramatic, because we will be giving up a fantastic 
opportunity to continue lifting people out of poverty. I think, yes, we 
are seeing a downside of increasing integration, although we must 
say that financial crises have 
happened before, even when 
economies tended to be more 
closed. So it is not inherent to 
globalization to have finan-
cial crises. You can still have 
financial crisis in individual, 
anarchic, autarchic countries. 
Now we feel it more intensely 
because financial systems have 
become more integrated, but I 
think there are also lessons in 
another respect, in the sense 
that to the extent that we 
become more integrated, we 
also need to be more coordi-
nated. We also need to accept 
that if we want to have the ben-
efits of globalization, we also 
need to be willing to give up 
a little bit of our sovereignty 
in order to coordinate and to 
cooperate with others. And 
I think the crisis that we are 
going through is not so much 
a failure of the market, but a 
failure of government—for 
failing to regulate adequately, for failing to coordinate with others, and 
to act decisively when it became evident that it was necessary to act.
JL: How do we bring about that cooperation among countries? Looking 
at the international scene right now, countries have different interests. 
As you certainly know, having been the president of a country, you are 
almost always involved in two sets of negotiations at once—you’re involved 
with negotiations with other countries, trying to find places where your 
interests overlap, but you’re also involved in discussions with people in 
your own country about what direction your country should take. So 
how in this much-more-complex world, where what happens in America 
or China or Brazil can have effects around the globe, do you get that 
kind of cooperation, that you quite rightly point out as being essential 
to sustaining globalization? 
EZ: Well, I think you need leadership. You need political leaders to 
speak to the people and to explain that international cooperation actu-
ally is in the national interest; that it is true that when you cooperate 
internationally, you give up some sovereignty, but that in the medium 
and long-term, your own country is going to have strategic and material 
benefits from that cooperation. The problem is that if the politicians 
spend their time blaming others for their own mistakes, or particularly 
other countries, they create a public opinion that goes against inter-
national cooperation. So that is why I say that you need leadership to 
explain to people that actual international cooperation is good for your 
own sake, something that hasn’t happened over the last few years. I 
think it is very suggestive that at the end of the Second World War, 
relatively speaking, the United States was a much more powerful coun-
try than it is today, because it was producing almost half of the global 
GDP. And overwhelmingly, from 
a military point of view, it was 
more powerful than it is today, 
and yet, those people—first 
Roosevelt, and then Truman 
and other American leaders—
were key in creating multilateral 
institutions for international 
cooperation, in which, in one 
way or another, the U.S. was 
giving up some sovereignty—
exactly at the time when it was 
by far a more powerful coun-
try, in relative terms, than it 
is today. I think this is a very 
good example of why, when you 
have the enlightenment and the 
vision, it is possible to do it. 
JL: So do we need new inter-
national institutions to handle 
globalization, or do we just need 
to improve existing ones?
EZ: Well, it depends on the 
topic. You tell me, “Well, what 
about peace and security?” Well, 
I think we need to have a better United Nations, certainly a more effec-
tive security council. We need an instrument for financial stability—we 
need to empower the International Monetary Fund, but maybe there 
are some areas in which we lack institutions, for example, in the field 
of the environment, we do not really have a global agency that can 
coordinate international efforts. So evidently, in that area we have a 
vacancy. So I would say it depends on the issues.
JL: So do you think the focus should be on global institutions or regional 
institutions? 
EZ: Well, I think you need both. I think you should follow, to the extent 
possible, the subsidiarity principle: those problems that can be solved 
at the local level should be solved at the local level. Those problems 
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that can be solved at the regional level should be solved regionally. But 
there are some problems, such as climate change, that cannot be solved 
regionally or locally or nationally, so you need a global solution. 
JL: If I may, I want to go back to the question you pointed out about the 
national trust, speaking to the domestic public about the positives in glo-
balization. As you know, even during the 1990s when globalization enjoyed 
a certain cachet, there were a number of critics. We saw that most notably 
in Seattle in 1999 with the meeting of the WTO. You coined the term 
“globalaphobics” to describe people who opposed globalization. Certainly 
here in the United States now with the economy going into recession there 
is a lot more resentment or concern, maybe even fear, about being part of 
the international economy. How do you make the case that, at the end of 
the day, globalization is in the best interest of the economy?
EZ: Well, I think that you have to analyze the outcomes, and you have 
to explain the outcomes to the people. Of course you have to start by 
recognizing that in the market economy, it is not true that every time, 
everywhere, everybody wins. Sometimes somewhere somebody loses, 
right? And then it becomes a political and social question whether you 
support or compensate the losers. And more frequently than not, gov-
ernments fail to support those losers, who from a social and political 
point of view should be compensated and supported in order to play 
on a level playing field. I think this has to be recognized. But then you 
have to move ahead and recognize that there are many people, includ-
ing in the United States, who have enormous benefits, from trade, from 
international investment, from globalization, and are totally unaware 
that they are beneficiaries of globalization. They are never told, and 
they never mobilize. They do not know how severely threatened they 
are by protectionism; how much the goods they buy in their Walmart 
depend on globalization; how much their local jobs, in a way, depend 
on globalization. Yet, some interest groups are able to mobilize people 
who feel or believe they have been affected by globalization, and they 
tend to have more influence than the passive beneficiaries of globaliza-
tion. SO you come back to the problem of leadership. A leader has to 
be evenhanded—you have to listen to the opponents of globalization, 
but you also have to talk to the beneficiaries of globalization, who are 
the majority, and you have to make them speak out and to make the 
case vis-à-vis the opponents. 
JL: Let me ask you one final question. Globalization is likely to remain 
a major issue, not just here in the United States but around the world. 
What role can universities play in helping enrich the public debate over 
globalization?
EZ: Well, I think educating better in those issues—not only teaching 
them the pure theory of international trade or a purely neoclassical 
approach to economics, I think you also have to present the case of 
the critics, to do research on the arguments of both sides, and engage 
the students in the debate, and to force them to engage in this debate 
in a careful, rigorous, intellectual way, not merely to adopt political 
positions without first analyzing the facts and the ideas. 
JL: Mr. President, thank you very much. ✹
BENSON LIBRARY ACQUIRES HORMAN PAPERS
In September 2008, UT’s Benson Latin American Collection, 
in collaboration with the Bernard and Audre Rapoport 
Center for Human Rights and Justice of the UT Law School, 
acquired the Joyce Horman and Edmund Horman Papers. 
The acquisition is part of the UT Libraries and Rapoport 
Center’s efforts to expand the archiving of documents at 
the University of Texas on human rights abuses worldwide.
The collection is named for the wife and father of Charles 
Horman, a Harvard-educated American writer and 
filmmaker killed during the Pinochet coup in September 
1973, and documents their attempts to uncover what 
happened to Charles when he went missing during the first 
days of the coup. When his body was found a month later, 
they continued to seek information on the circumstances of 
his death. Ultimately, they learned he had been abducted, 
tortured, and murdered at the start of the coup, which 
ended the democratically elected government of socialist 
Salvador Allende. The events surrounding his death 
are documented in the 1978 Thomas Hauser book The 
Execution of Charles Horman and dramatized in the 1982 
Costa-Gavras film Missing.
The archive includes documents from the Joyce Horman v. 
Henry Kissinger lawsuit, correspondence between Edmund 
Horman and government officials, and copies of declassi-
fied documents the family obtained through the Freedom 
of Information Act. In 1999, a previously heavily redacted 
State Department memo was released regarding the role 
of U.S. intelligence in Horman’s death. It admitted that, at 
the very least, the U.S. provided information that motivated 
his murder by the government of Chile; at worst, U.S. 
intelligence knew that the government of Chile saw 
Horman as a threat and did nothing to prevent his murder.
The acquisition of the papers was commemorated with 
a human rights panel in the Benson Rare Books Room on 
September 12, 2008, and included, among others, Peter 
Kornbluh of the National Security Archive, Ariel Dulitzky 
of the Rapoport Center, Chilean human rights psychologist 
Elizabeth Kornfeld, and Joyce Horman. The archive, which 
provides researchers with valuable primary material on U.S. 
Cold War policy in Latin America, will continue to grow 
with additions by Joyce Horman. Edmund Horman died in 
1993 at the age of 87.
For more information on the Horman Papers, visit 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlac/00271/lac-00271.html 
or contact Benson archivist Christian Kelleher at 
<kelleher@mail.utexas.edu>.
